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DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
HEADS AND DEPUTY HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, SEPTEMBER 21,
2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-001.

12. (U) Meeting Date: September 21, 2009
Time: 10:15 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S.	Russia
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller	Ambassador Antonov
Ambassador Ries	Mr. Koshelev
Dr. Warner	

13. (S) On Monday, September 21, 2009 at 10:15 a.m., a coffee
took place at the Russian Mission prior to the start of the
first plenary meeting of the session. Ambassador Antonov
opened the discussion by noting the very positive nature of
President Obama's decision on the missile defense sites in
Poland and the Czech Republic, which had taken place on
September 16. He then stated interest in further
developments in U.S. missile defense programs, raising a
long-standing Russian concern that mobile components of
missile defense may take on a strategic character. For that
reason, he said, Ambassador Kislyak had requested in
Washington that a team be sent to Geneva to brief Russian
technical experts on present U.S. plans. Minister of Foreign
Affairs Lavrov, he said, had urgently requested such a
briefing, in order to be prepared for the upcoming meeting
between the U.S. and Russian Presidents. The meeting was

requested in Geneva, he explained, because all of the best Russian technical experts on missile defenses were participating on the START Delegation. We could set aside some time one afternoon, Antonov said, for them to be briefed.

14. (S) A/S Gottemoeller said that she would pass the message back to Washington, but that it would be difficult to organize such a briefing in Geneva, most of all because the two delegations should stay focused on the START talks. Very little time remains before December, she said, and the delegations really need to focus their attention. However, she knew that Amb Kislyak would be briefed by the White House if he had not been briefed already. (Begin comment: This briefing did take place on September 21 in Washington. End comment.) Furthermore, the United States intended to provide a thorough technical briefing to the Russian side just as soon as it could be scheduled.

15. (S) Antonov turned to START. He said the Russian side had gotten the go-ahead from the President's office to hand over their draft of the treaty annex, which would consolidate into one document the multiple documents that in START had covered inspections, conversion or elimination, data exchange, notifications, and other matters. The text would be provided in Russian. When Gottemoeller noted that it was difficult to work without an informal English translation provided by the Russian side, Antonov apologized for the lack of depth on the Russian language services bench. He said it was his problem, but he asked for understanding: he simply did not have enough translators. He stated that he had invited Mr. Artemyev, an experienced hand who had retired, to

join the delegation as an expert, so that he now had four translators and an expert who could help with conforming.

16. (S) Gottemoeller noted that the Presidents would be meeting later in the week, and that President Obama would give a generally positive assessment of the negotiations so far, but stress the need to accelerate the pace of work. Antonov said that if the two Presidents agreed on that point publicly, it would help him to force the pace with his delegation. Gottemoeller then turned to the schedule that the U.S. side had proposed, including work in Geneva through October 2, then a break to return to capitals October 5-9, and a meeting in Moscow during the week of October 11 for a small group made up of the U.S. agency heads. The delegations would then return to Geneva on or about October 19, and begin meeting in continuous session until the treaty was completed. Antonov said that he could see the schedule clearly through November 1, and he agreed to the U.S. team's proposal, including the proposal for a small team to come to Moscow. However, the Russian Delegation would return to Moscow for a week at the beginning of November. All the Russian Delegation members would want to check their work with superiors in their agencies, he explained, and this could only be done by going to Moscow. Gottemoeller asked if Antonov would be willing to leave experts behind to work during the week of October 5, and he answered that he was not willing to do so. They cannot work without me, he said, they need a babysitter.

17. (S) Antonov commented that he is not against staying in Geneva, and may be willing to do so later, but at the moment he still needed to keep closely in touch with Moscow, to ensure that the Russian Delegation is going in the right direction. My assumption, he said, is that we have a lot in common in the treaty, but many details of the accompanying protocols will be different. Moreover, he did not yet know how the U.S. side would handle the specific proposals that the Russian side had made about missile defense and other issues. As a personal idea, he said, maybe we should fix something in this treaty about the U.S. decision on the third missile defense site.

18. (S) Gottemoeller remarked that the United States had already moved beyond the third site project thanks to President Obama's decision, and it would be strange to record

an ephemeral moment in treaty language. Antonov then said that maybe it would not be appropriate to mention the third site decision in the treaty text, but it was an important decision for the Russian side and they wanted to understand more about it. For that reason, he said, the Russian side wants to examine the U.S. proposal closely so that Moscow can decide whether it has the basis to start cooperating on missile defense. He asked again for a team to brief Russian missile experts, and Gottemoeller reiterated that she would pass the request to Washington.

¶9. (S) Gottemoeller ended the meeting by noting that the U.S. side was ready to begin conforming the draft "Agreement on Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk," without prejudice to the U.S. position that continuous monitoring should play a role in the new START agreement. Antonov acknowledged the point, and agreed that Sergei

Koshelev could meet with Jerry Taylor on the margins of the current START negotiating round, to carry out the conforming exercise.

¶10. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶11. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS